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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
O,F THE STAT'E OF UTAH
WESTERN CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Plain~ff and Respondent,

)'

•,

TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent,
v.
DAN ALLISON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

12265

Brief of Respondent
Transamerica Insurance Company
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by
Western Casualty and Surety Company seeking a determination of whether liability insurance was extended by it
or Transamerica Insurance Company to Dan Allison or
Ricky Lee Allison.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Wasatch County, Honorable
Maurice Harding presiding, gr'anted summary judgment
1
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rn favor of Western Casualty and Surety Company and
Transamerica Insurance Company denying liability coverage to Dan Allison or Ricky Lee Allison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Transamerica Insurance Company seeks
affirmance of the judgment of the District Court of Wasatch County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Transamerica Insurance Company's policy was issued
to James H. Maddox. Western Casualty and Surety Company issued its policy to Dan Allison, father of Ricky Lee
Allison.
On May 18, 1968, the afternoon prior to the accident,
James H. Maddox left Heber City to go to Price, Utah,
in an automobile owned by Dan Allison, his father-in-law.
At the request of Dan Allison, James H. Maddox
loaned his 1966 jeep to Ricky Lee Allison for Ricky Lee
Allison to use going to and from his milking job. No
permission was granted Ricky Lee Allison to use the
jeep for any other purpose.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 19, 1968, an accident occurred on Highway 40 some 22 miles east of Heber
City. At the time of the accident Blaine Orvel Sweat and
Ricky Lee Allison were using the 1966 jeep to assist Craig
Fuhriman in putting gasoline in an automobile operated
by Fuhriman which had run out of gas. Ricky Lee Alli·
2
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son drove the jeep 22 miles east of Heber City without
permission and in violation of specific instructions previously given him by James H. Maddox and Steven Maddox, the minor son of James H. Maddox. The depositions
of James H. Maddox, Steven Maddox and Dan Allison
were taken and their testimony is as follows:
JAMES H. MADDOX

Mr. Maddox was the owner of the 1966 jeep. He
had a conversation with Dan Allison on May 18, 1968.
Mr. Allison said Ricky had a milking job and needed
transportation. James Maddox agreed to allow Ricky to
use the jeep and subsequently called Ricky on the telephone. He told him that "he could use the jeep to milk
his cows and to go back and forth to Christiansen's."
"I told him I didn't want him driving around anyplace
else." Ricky agreed to this, and at no time indicated that
he would have a date that night, or that he planned on
attending a high school dance (Deposition of James H.
Maddox, pages 4, 5, and 6). James Maddox later saw
Ricky Allison in front of the Allison home and again
told him that he had permission to use the jeep for going
back and forth to his milking job, "but that was all"
(Id. at 7). James Maddox had told his son, Steven Maddox, that Ricky Allison was to have the use of the jeep,
but that Ricky was "just to use it to go back and forth to
milk his cows" (Id. at 9). James Maddox did not authorize his son, Steven Maddox, to loan out any of his vehicles.
"I didn't allow Steven to loan the jeep to anybody." "He
had no permission to loan my vehicles, never" (Id. at
] 2, 24).

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STEVEN MADDOX

Steven knew that his father had loaned the jeep to
Ricky Allison to be used only for driving to and from
Ricky's milking job. (Deposition of Steven Maddox, pages
7 and 15)
Steven next saw the jeep at the high school parking
lot. He subsequently had an argument with Ricky Allison
and told him to take the jeep home (Id. at 8, 21, 22). He
told Ricky that "since dad was good enough to let him
take the jeep, he should at least abide by the restrictions
that he placed upon it." "If dad was going to let him
take the jeep, he should have just took it back and forth
to milk, and that I had heard he had been rodding it all
over, and that was my gas in it he was running out."
Ricky said, "Well, if that's the way you feel about it, get
in it and take it home" (Id. at 8, 21-24). Steven took the
jeep home and subsequently learned that Ricky Allison
and Blaine Sweat had two girls up at Ricky's home with
no way to take the girls home. Steven called Ricky at
about 8:00 p.m. and said "Well, I'll bring the jeep back
up so that you can take them home (Id. at 26). He then
delivered the jeep back to Ricky, apologized for the previous argument, and told Ricky to "Take the girls home
with it ... just don't rod it and don't run all my gas out"
(Id. at 27). Steven subsequently went home and went to
bed. Steven knew that he had no authority to loan the
jeep ... I just gave it to him. I never - I don't believe
that I could lend the jeep to anybody I wanted to just on
the spur of the moment. It wasn't mine. I had to have
permission every time I took it myself, let alone let any-

4
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body else drive it. In fact, I wasn't even sure I had permission to go take it that night - the first time . . ."
(Id. at 10).
Steven also testified that he had to have permission
from his father every time he used the jeep and that his
father would be angry if he knew he had used it without
permission (Id. at 31, 32).

In his deposition, Steven Maddox testified as follows:
"Q. Now, under the circumstances that
existed after you had taken the jeep away from
Ricky, the circumstances to which I refer are the
facts that Ricky and Blaine were at Ricky's house
with the girls, did you believe you had authority
to give the jeep to Ricky that night under those
circumstances?
"A. No, I didn't think I had the authority.
I just left them and told them to take the girls
home. I mean, I've done a lot of things my dad
wouldn't have me do, knowing darn well he was
going to be mad about it. But I didn't know
whether he was going to be mad about it or not in
truth. I just left it.
"Q. You don't know whether he would object or not to that one, is that what you said?
"A. Yes. I never asked him. I don't know
whether he would have objected or not." (Id. at
12).
DAN ALLISON

Dan Allison is the father of Ricky Lee Allison. He
testified that he had a conversation with James Maddox
regarding to loaning of the jeep, and that James would
see that Ricky got transportation to drive back and forth
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to his milking job. The only arrangements made with
James Maddox were to get transportation so that Ricky
could go back and forth to work (Deposition of Dan Allison, pp. 5-8). He was not aware of his son, Ricky, ever
using any of James Maddox's vehicles prior to this occasion (Id. at 26).
Other evidence indicates that between 12:00 midnight and 1:00 a.m., May 19, Ricky Lee Allison and
Blaine Sweat, with two girls, met the Fuhriman and Lunt
boys at a service station in Heber City. They took the
girls home and then returned to assist the Fuhriman and
Lunt boys with their automobile. The four of them drove
approximately 22 miles east of Heber City, at which time
the accident occurred. Ricky Lee Allison did not request
permisison to drive the jeep out of Heber City.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS RICKY LEE ALLISON DEVIATED BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF THE PERMISSION GRANTED HIM IN
USING THE JEEP, HE AND DAN ALLISON ARE
NONINSUREDS OF TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE
COMPANY.

The basic issue is: Was Ricky Lee Allison using the
jeep within the scope of permission granted him by James
H. Maddox at the time of the accident? If he was using
the jeep within the scope of the permission granted, he
would be an omnibus insured. If he was using the jeep
beyond the scope of the permission granted, neither he
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nor Dan Allison are extended any msurance coverage
under Transamerica's liability policy. Transamerica's policy provides:
"Persons Insured: The following are insureds under Part I:

(a) with respect to the owned automobile.

* * *

(2) any other person using such automobile
with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the
scope of such permission . . . "
(Defendant's Exhibit I)
Unless the operation of the jeep by Ricky Lee Allison
1s within the scope of any permission granted him by
James H. Maddox, there is no coverage. Whether the
negligence of Ricky Lee Allison is imputed to his father
is immaterial. Dan Allison can stand in no better position
than the actual operator of the jeep. If Ricky Lee Allison
was using the jeep at the time of the accident beyond the
scope of the permission granted him by James H. Maddox,
neither he nor his father are insureds under the policy
of insurance issued by Transamerica Insurance Company.
Transamerica Insurance Company submits that the
order of the lower court was correct because the evidence
in this case shows that in using the jeep at the time and
place of the accident Ricky Lee Allison was engaged in a
material deviation beyond the scope of any implied or express permisison granted him.

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In this case a major deviation occurred. Ricky Lee Allison was given permission to use the jeep only for driving
the two or three miles to and from a milking job. Instead,
he took the jeep to a dance, took some girls out, and then,
in the middle of night at about approximately 1: 30 a.m.,
he took the jeep from Heber City to the place of the accident, 22 miles away. Ricky Allison's deviation was major
and clearly beyond the scope of the permission granted
him in the use of the jeep.
Where the use of the vehicle is in direct violation of
specific express instructions, there is no implied consent
to use a vehicle on major deviation.
In Johnson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 34 F. Supp.
870 (W. D. Wis. 1940), an automobile salesman, in violation of his employer's express instructions and company
rules, retained the employer's automobile after working
hours and was taking his date to dinner to a place five
miles outside of the city limits when he was involved in
an accident. The court held that Wirth, the driver of the
vehicle, was not an omnibus insured as it was clear and
undisputed that he was using the vehicle for his own
purposes and beyond the scope of the permission granted
by the employer.
In Wilson v. Farnsworth, 4 So. 2d 247 (La. App.
1941), where an employee took the employer's truck to
perform a personal errand without requesting permission
and in direct violation of express rules and instructions,
and was involved in an accident while so using the truck,
8
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it was held the employee was not an omnibus insured as
his use was without permission, express or implied.

Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wash. 2d 34, 290 P.2d. 713,
717 (1955), states the rule in cases of this nature as follows:
"In order for a person to come within the coverage of the omnibus clause in a standard policy
of liability insurance, it must be established that
his use of the car was with the permission, expressed or implied, of the person designated in the
policy as the named insured."
No Utah case in point his been discovered. There
are, however, many cases dealing with this type of situation. Illustrative of these cases is Truex v. Pennsylvania
Manuf actttrers Association Casualty Insurance Company,
116 Pa. Super. 551, 176 A. 756 (1935). In that case, the
automobile owner gave permission to a guest to drive
another guest to his home four blocks away. Instead, the
guests took a pleasure drive in the opposite direction and
were involved in an accident several miles away from
home. It was held that such a drive was a radical departure from the use for which the automobile was granted,
and the owner's liability insurer therefore was not liable.
The court said:
"Permission to drive to a designated place
four blocks away did not give authority to drive
some miles distant in the opposite direction. This
was not a slight deviation, it was a radical departure - an entirely new and different use than was
averred to have been granted."

9
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In Howe v. Farmers Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 32 Wash. 2d 511, 202 P.2d 464 (1949), the driver
had received permission from the owner to repair the
automobile and return it to the owner's home. At the
time of the accident, he was on business of his own and
driving strictly for his own pleasure. The court held
that at the time of the accident he did not have express or
implied permission to use the car for his own personal
pleasure or business, and the owner's insurance policy
would not extend coverage to him.
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v.
Sanders, 169 Okla. 378, 36 P.2d 271 (1934), it was held
that an owner allowing one to drive an automobile on a
certain mission did not imply permission to allow another
person to drive said car the next day in a different town,
and no insurance coverage was extended. The court cited
from the case of Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13
P.2d 55, 56 (1932):
"The issue is whether Miss Roberts had the
permission of Nalley's Inc., to use the car as and
when the collision occurred. That she did not have
such permission, express or implied, to use the car
at the place, at the time, and under the circum·
stances, or for purposes existing at the time of the
collision, was clearly established and must be so
held and declared as a matter of law."
The "additional assured" portion of the insurance con·
tract was held not operative. Also see Grange Insurance
Association v. Eschback, 1 Wash. App. 230, 460 P.2d 690
( 1969).
10
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7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, §4367
(1962), states the majority rule to be that the vehicle must
be used for a purpose reasonably within the scope of the
permission granted, within the time limits imposed or
contemplated by the parties, and operated within the geographical limits so contemplated, or the use is not covered.
In this case, it is clear that Ricky Lee Allison operated
the jeep beyond the geographical limits of his permitted
use. It cannot be implied that his use was within the time
limits contemplated going to and from his milking job.
His use was also for a purpose entirely beyond the scope
of the permission granted him.
When considering the time the vehicle was being
used, the geographical place where it was being used and
the purpose for which it was being used, it is apparent
that Ricky Lee Allison in using the jeep at the time of
the accident was engaged in a radical departure from the
scope of permission granted him to use the jeep. At the
time of the collision he was using the jeep in an area
where he had no permission to use it (22 miles east of
Heber City), for an unauthorized and uncontemplated
purpose (helping the Fuhriman and Lunt boys), and at
an unusually late hour (2:00 a.m.).
By driving the jeep for a purpose and at a time and
place not contemplated by the owner thereof, Ricky Lee
Allison removed himself from the provisions of the policy
providing coverage to one using the automobile with permission.
The appellant's brief refers to an emergency situation and implies that permission would have been granted
11
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to Ricky Lee Allison to drive 25 miles east of Heber City
to assist the Fuhriman and Lunt boys. The appellant
poses the question as to whether a permissive user must
leave the bleeding victims of an automobile accident along
the side of the road in order to preserve the protection
of the insurance policy. Obviously, if there was a danger
to human life an emergency situation would be present
in which the deviation from the agreed-to course of the
automobile would be acceptable within reasonable limitations. However, in this case there is nothing to establish
an emergency situation on the part of Fuhriman and Lunt.
These boys were not in an emergency. They were standing in a service station in Heber City where aid was available and where they were safe.
In Bower v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 13 Wis.
2d 21, 108 N.W.2d 271 (1961), a mother gave her daughter permission to use the automobile to pick up some
class pictures. While her daughter was in the studio the
police informed her passenger that the car should be
moved as it was in a no parking area. While moving the
car, the passenger had an accident. The court held that
no emergency existed which would create implied consent
by the owner of the car to allow the passenger to operate the automobile. Accordingly, the passenger was not
covered as an omnibus insured under the mother's liability insurance policy. It would seem that a directive of
this nature from a police officer would constitute more
of an emergency situation than the gratuitous attempt on
the part of Ricky Lee Allison to help Fuhriman and Lunt
get their automobile filled with gas.
12
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POINT II
STEVEN MADDOX HAD NO AUTHORI1Y TO
GIVE RICK ALLISON PERMISSION TO USE THE
JEEP.

The appellant's brief in its Conclusion claims that
the vehicle was returned to Ricky Allison by Steve Maddox without restriction except the instruction not to "rod
it." The depositions indicate that it was made perfectly
clear to Ricky Allison that he was not only not to "rod it"
but was not to use it for any purpose other than taking
the girls home.
Further, appellant's argument misses the point . Because a certain restriction is not placed upon the use it
does not logically follow that all uses, save uses specifically
excepted, are permitted. Appellant cannot find authorized
use in every area where no specific restriction was imposed. The scope of permission granted establishes the
authorized use - not the possible uses remaining after all
restrictions are applied.
Regardless of the actual terms of the redelivery of
the vehicle to Ricky to Steve Maddox, Steve Maddox had
no authority to deliver the vehicle to Rick Allison on any
terms different from those orginally entered into by James
Maddox and Rick Allison. The record clearly indicates
that Steve knew that he had no authority to lend out his
father's vehicles. A fortiori, since he testified that he
was not even to use his father's vehicles himself without
his father's permission, he could not have had authority
to expand the rules of permitted use set down by his
father.
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In Norris v. Pacific Indemnit:y Co., 39 Cal.2d 420,
247 P.2d 1 (1952), it appeared that the owner of the
vehicle had given his son permission to use a car but prohibited him from loaning it to any other person. While
at a fried's home, the son loaned the car to another party,
who subsequently was involved in an accident. The court
held that there was no permission for the third party to
use the car and that no insurance applied. The court
sta::ed the rule that "where the facts as here showed
neither express nor implied permission for the permittee's
delegation of the use of the car to another, the third person has been held not to be the responsible person with
permission and therefore not protected by the omnibus
clause." 247 P.2d at 4.
In Civil Service Employees Insurance Co. v. Roberts,
10 Ariz. App. 512, 460 P.2d 48 (1969), the owner of a
jeep occasionally allowed his son to drive it. He was
required to seek his father's permission for each use of the
jeep, and there was a general understanding between
them that the jeep was not to be loaned out or driven
by others. While using the jeep with permission, he
allowed his girl friend to drive it and an accident ensued.
The court held that the son was not a named insured or
an owner within the meaning of the policy, had no authority to give permission to another to drive the jeep, and
thus no insurance applied to the girl who was driving.
The court s'lid, "In our view the particular risk resulting in this accident was not one within the contemplation
of the parties to this contract and is fairly within this
exclusionary clause." 460 P.2d at 51.
14
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A similar case was reported in Helmkamp v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 407 S.W.2d 559, (Mo.
App. 1966), where the minor son of the owner of the
insured automobile was permitted to drive to a church
social gathering. The minor had his father's permission
to take a girl friend home in the car, but acceded to her
request that she be allowed to drive around the block.
The court held that the person seeking to be insured did
not meet her burden of showing that the owner "either
through his words, conduct, or the nature and scope of
the permisson granted by him to Robert (the minor son),
indicated Robert, in turn, would be clothed with authority
to pass on (his father's) permission to (the driver)".
Similar results were reached in the cases of ]ones v.
Indiana Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Co., 161 So.2d
445, (La. App. 1964); Indemnity Insurance Co. of North
America v. Sanders, 169 Okla. 378, 36 P.2d 271 (1934);
Grange Insurance Association v. Eschback, 1 Wash. App.
230, 460 P.2d 690 ( 1969); and Hamm v. Camerota, 48
Wash. 2d 34, 290 P.2d 713 (1955).
It should also be noted that the terms of Transamer-

ica's policy require that the use of a non-owned automobile be "within the permission or reasonably believed to
be with the permission, of the owner and is within the
scope of such permission." Defendant's Exhibit 1 at 6.
It is undisputed that Steven Maddox was not the owner
of the automobile, and the testimony contained in the
depositions clearly establishes that he had no authority
to lend the automobile to Ricky Lee Allison.
15
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The appellant's brief sets forth the general proposition that any ambiguity in the insurance policies must be
construed in favor of the insured. There is nothing ambiguous about the permissive user clause of Transamerica's
insurance policy. It simply requires permission from the
owner of the vehicle. The depositions on file herein
clearly indicate that no permission was given by the
owner of the jeep, nor by his son (who had no authority
m any event). It should be apparent that no ambiguity
exists.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed
because:
1. Ricky Lee Allison was using the jeep beyond the
scope of the express permission granted him by James H.
Maddox.

2. The boys did not have implied permission because they were using the jeep on a major deviation at
the time of the accident.
Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of
Transamerica Insurance Company should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
Allan L. Larson
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
Transamerica Insurance Company

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing
brief, postage prepaid, to John L. Chidester, 51 West
Center Street, Heber City, Utah, and two copies to Glenn
" Utah this _______ _
C. Hanni, Boston Building, Salt Lake City,
day of ----------------------------------------• 1971.
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